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RETRIBUTIVIST THEORIES’ CONJOINED TWINS PROBLEMS
Brittany L. Deitch

This Article expands a previously published article, which introduced
a novel problem to the centuries-old debate on the retributivist
justification of punishment. The first article applied the problem of
conjoined twins, where one commits a crime and the other is innocent,
to pure retributivism. The conjoined twins problem showed that pure
retributivism, which holds absolute duties to punish all who are guilty
and none who are innocent, fails as a complete theory of punishment.
This Article broadens the application of the conjoined twins problem by
applying the problem to other versions of retributivism, including
deontological, consequentialist, threshold, negative/weak, victimconscious, and mixed retributivist theories. Exploring each version in
turn, this Article uses the conjoined twins problem to show that no
version of retributivism can serve as a complete theory of punishment.

* Case Writing Fellow, Harvard Law School. I would like to thank Russell Christopher and Stephen
Galoob for piquing my interest in theories of punishment and for advising and supporting me throughout
my first Article and this expansion. I would also like to thank Will Thomas for his valuable criticisms of
an earlier version of this Article.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Consider the following:1 A set of conjoined twins, Guilty Twin and
Innocent Twin, has an argument with Victim. Guilty Twin murders
Victim despite Innocent Twin’s protests. Guilty Twin has complete
dominion over the right arm used to wield the murder weapon. Innocent
Twin could not prevent the crime from occurring. Guilty Twin is clearly
guilty; Innocent Twin is clearly innocent. To avoid complicating this
hypothetical with the legal and ethical questions surrounding a courtordered separation for the twins, suppose the twins are conjoined in such
a way that they share vital organs making separation impossible without
causing the death of both twins. The twins stand trial with only Guilty
Twin named as a defendant. If Guilty Twin is punished, Innocent Twin
will necessarily suffer the punishment. However, forgoing punishing the
innocent sets the guilty twin free. Thus, only two options are available:
punish both twins or punish neither twin. What should the criminal law
do?2 What must3 or may4 a retributivist do?
1. This problem was originally presented in an earlier publication and applied to pure
retributivism to demonstrate pure retributivism’s failure to serve as a comprehensive theory of
punishment. Brittany L. Deitch, Retributivism’s Conjoined Twins Problem, 53 CRIM. L. BULL. 953
(2017).
2. Although this problem seems far-fetched or implausible, American courts have struggled
with imposing criminal penalties upon conjoined defendants on at least four occasions. None of these
cases addressed murder charges. The first involved assault. The second involved assault and battery.
The third involved breach of the peace. The fourth involved an arrestable traffic offense. Deitch, supra
note 1, at 964-66.
3. Strong versions of retributivism hold an absolute duty to punish. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT,
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 142 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991) (1797) (posing his famous disbanding
island society hypothetical, and arguing that even though there would be no deterrent effect of
punishment, every last murderer in that society’s prison must be punished so that “blood guilt does not
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Stated most simply and generally, retributivism is a theory that
justifies punishment on the basis of the offender’s culpability or desert.5
Retributivism’s Conjoined Twins Problem, this Article’s predecessor,
applied the conjoined twins problem to what may be termed pure
retributivism, a “jealous theory” 6 that holds equal duties7 and categorical
imperatives to punish all who are guilty and none who are innocent.8
That article discusses the conjoined twins problem with an emphasis on
the significance of the personhood of the twins.9 Regardless of whether
a pure retributivist views the twins as two distinct persons or as two
halves of one whole person, his theory fails to determine whether
punishment of Guilty Twin is justified under the core tenets of his

cling to the people for not having insisted upon this punishment; for otherwise the people can be
regarded as collaborators in this public violation of justice.”); See also, MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING
BLAME: A THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 154 (1997) (“As a theory of a kind of justice, [retributivism]
obligates us to seek retribution through the punishment of the guilty. This means that officials have a
duty to punish deserving offenders . . . .”) (emphasis in original); Russell L. Christopher, Deterring
Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 866 n.119 (2002)
(explaining “obligatory retributivism,” which holds that, because an offender has the “right to be
punished,” he must be punished) [hereinafter Christopher, Deterring].
4. Some versions of retributivism merely provide permission to punish. See Christopher,
Deterring, supra note 3, at 866 n.120 (contrasting permissive retributivism with obligatory retributivism
to explain that “permissive retributivism does not mandate punishment, but merely justifies its
permissibility.”).
5. See Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 845 n.1 (2002) ("Retributivism is a theory, or
justification, of punishment.”); MOORE, supra note 3, at 92 (“[R]etributivism asserts that punishment is
properly inflicted because, and only because, the person deserves it. That some people deserve
punishment on such a theory is both a necessary and a sufficient condition justifying criminal
sanctions.”); Joel Feinberg, The Classic Debate, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 614 (Joel Feinberg &
Hyman Gross eds., 1991) (“Punishment is justified only on the ground that wrongdoing merits
punishment.”); A.M. Quinton, On Punishment, in PHIL. PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 6, 7 (Gertrude
Ezorsky ed., SUNY Press 1972) (“The essential contention of retributivism is that punishment is only
justified by guilt.”). For an overview of the debate between retributivism and its competing theory of
punishment, consequentialism, see generally Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 855-65.
6. See George P. Fletcher, The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 51, 52 (1999) (“[R]etributivism is a jealous theory in the sense that whatever the beneficial sideeffects of punishment, if it is not deserved it cannot possibly be justified.”).
7. See MOORE, supra note 3, at 157 (“[T]he guilty going unpunished is exactly the same
magnitude of evil as the innocent being punished.”).
8. The most prominent modern proponent of this theory is Michael Moore, who vigorously
explains and defends pure retributivism in his book Placing Blame. Id. at 92 (“[R]etributivism asserts
that punishment is properly inflicted because, and only because, the person deserves it. That some
people deserve punishment on such a theory is both a necessary and a sufficient condition justifying
criminal sanctions.”); Id. at 154 (“As a theory of a kind of justice, [retributivism] obligates us to seek
retribution through the punishment of the guilty. This means that officials have a duty to punish
deserving offenders . . . .”) (emphasis in original); see also Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the
Real World, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 815, 848 (2007) (explaining that retributivists have equal moral duties
to punish the guilty and not punish the innocent).
9. See generally Deitch, supra note 1, at 970 (“The retributivist might treat twins A and B as
two halves of one whole person and elect to punish . . . On the other hand, if the retributivist treats
conjoined twins as two distinct persons, then he must decide which duty supersedes the other.”).
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theory.10 Under a two-person conceptualization, a pure retributivist
would violate his positive duty to punish all who are guilty (with respect
to Guilty Twin) if he forgoes punishing the twins, or his negative duty to
never punish an innocent (with respect to Innocent Twin) if he opts to
punish the twins. Under a same-person conceptualization, a pure
retributivist would elect punishment of the twins because the twins are
responsible for a murder. However, the same-person conceptualization
is unsupported by legal and biological treatment of conjoined twins.
Further, assigning desert-based punishment is insurmountably
complicated when two minds–one guilty and one innocent–are at play.
By exploring every possible approach, a pure retributivist might take in
determining whether punishment is justified or prohibited,
Retributivism’s Conjoined Twins Problem concludes that pure
retributivism fails as a comprehensive theory of punishment because of
its inability to resolve the conjoined twins problem without violating one
of its core tenets.
This Article presents and applies the conjoined twins problem to
impure versions of retributivism. This expansion comprehensively
explores all versions of retributivism to examine whether any existing
variety of retributivism can satisfactorily resolve the conjoined twins
problem. Part I succinctly summarizes Retributivism’s Conjoined Twins
Problem to establish the analytical framework employed throughout this
Article. Part II provides brief descriptions of each version of
retributivism: deontological, consequentialist, threshold, negative,
victim-oriented, and mixed/hybrid. Following each overview is an
application of that version’s principles to the conjoined twins problem.
After meticulously considering whether each version can satisfactorily
resolve the conjoined twins problem under its tenets, this Article
concludes that the conjoined twins problem reveals a fatal flaw of each
and every desert-based justification of punishment. Even where a
version seems able to resolve the problem through punishment or release
of the twins, its resolution draws attention to the theory’s other internal
flaws.
II.

OVERVIEW OF PURE RETRIBUTIVISM’S CONJOINED TWINS
PROBLEM

Pure retributivism holds two categorical, absolute duties: the positive
duty to punish the guilty and the negative duty to never punish the
innocent.11 By contrast, the competing theory of punishment,
10. See generally Deitch, supra note 1, at 982.
11. See, e.g., Quinton, supra note 5, at 137 (“[W]e cannot punish the innocent and must only
punish the guilty.”) (emphasis in original).
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consequentialism, holds that punishment is justified when the good
consequences for society flowing from the punishment outweigh the bad
consequences for society.12 Critics of pure retributivism argue that pure
retributivism’s twin duties cannot be satisfied in light of the common
prosecutorial practices of plea-bargaining and immunity,13 the practical
impossibility of a zero-error rate in convictions,14 and the inevitable
suffering of the wrongdoer’s family and friends.15 Retributivists reply to
these charges by rejecting the common prosecutorial practices,16 relying
upon the doctrine of double effect,17 defining punishment to exclude the
suffering of non-offenders from its definition,18 or falling back on a
softer version of retributivism.19
None of these standard defenses can save retributivism from the
problem conjoined twins presents.20 The conjoined twins problem does
not depend on the existence of any particular practice or system of
12. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUST. 1336,
1338 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983) (“The dominant approaches to justification [of punishment] are
retributive and utilitarian [a synonym for consequentialism]. Briefly stated, a retributivist claims that
punishment is justified because people deserve it; a utilitarian believes that justification lies in the useful
purposes that punishment serves.”).
13. See Russell L. Christopher, The Prosecutor’s Dilemma: Bargains and Punishments, 72
FORDHAM L. REV. 93 (2003-2004) (presenting the Prosecutor’s Dilemma, where a prosecutor must
violate one duty or the other when deciding whether to make an offer of immunity to one prisoner in
order to punish that prisoner’s confederates) [hereinafter Christopher, Dilemma]; Michael T. Cahill,
supra note 8, at 854 (“Under the absolutist model [of retributivism], law enforcement at the
prosecutorial stage would focus on making certain that all, and only, identified wrongdoers were
punished in an amount appropriate to their desert. Accordingly, the absolutist model would categorically
ban plea bargaining, witness immunity, downward departures for substantial assistance, or any other
failure to impose deserved punishment.”).
14. See, e.g., Richard O. Lempert, An Assessment of the Moral Bases of the Case for Capital
Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1177, 1182 (1981) (“Retributivism is also haunted by those executions of
the innocent which inevitably occur if the death penalty is allowed.”).
15. See, e.g., Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 879 (“Another way that retributivism is
claimed to justify intentional punishment of the innocent is that infliction of punishment on a guilty
offender will most likely inflict pain and suffering on his or her friends and family who are innocent of
the offense.”).
16. See Christopher, Dilemma, supra note 13, at 99 (“Retributivists implicitly assume that the
incompatibility of bargain justice and retributivism warrants rejection of the former.”).
17. See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 1656 (Fathers of the English Dominican
Prince trans., 1947) II-II, quest. 64, 7th art. (establishing the doctrine of double effect, which justifies an
act which has both a good and a bad consequence if only the good consequence is intended and the bad
consequence is an unfortunate side-effect); Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 920 (“Since only the
good effect of punishment of the guilty is intended and the bad side effect of punishment of the innocent
or nonculpable is unintended, the conditions for [Aquinas’ doctrine of double effect]’s applicability are
satisfied.”).
18. See Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 879 (“[A] retributivist might reply that such
suffering by friends and family members fails to fall within the notion of what is meant by
punishment.”).
19. See Deitch, supra note 1, at 963.
20. The remaining information in this section can be found in the earlier article. Deitch, supra
note 1.
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punishment, because it simply asks whether punishment is justified. The
doctrine of double effect proves fruitless as a retributivist defense
because punishment of Innocent Twin is not merely an unintended
consequence of punishing Guilty Twin. Punishing Guilty Twin requires
the retributivist to knowingly, intentionally punish an identifiable
innocent, Innocent Twin. The definitional approach also fails, because if
Guilty Twin is punished, Innocent Twin will suffer in exactly the same
way as Guilty Twin. Innocent Twin’s suffering cannot fairly be
categorized as anything but punishment because his suffering amounts
to more than an incidental side-effect.21 Retributivists’ arsenal of
existing defenses is thus unhelpful in avoiding the conjoined twins
problem.
Turning to the problem of conjoined twins, the retributivist must
answer two preliminary questions. First is an inquiry into whether the
defendant is a person. Once the personhood inquiry is affirmatively
established, the second step is to ask whether that person is a morally
responsible agent. The first inquiry is usually taken for granted and has
not been sufficiently explored in the past. While retributivist Michael
Moore has developed a personhood theory for identifying whether
punishment is justified, his theory is unhelpful in establishing the
personhood status of conjoined twins. The second question usually
arises in cases of insanity defenses or juvenile adjudications. After
thoroughly considering sources from which retributivists might draw
their personhood theory or definition, it becomes apparent that the
retributivist ought to treat the conjoined twins as two persons. However,
a particularly resolute retributivist could make some weaker arguments
that the conjoined twins may be treated as one person.
Using a two-person conceptualization, pure retributivists must choose
which core duty to honor and which to violate. To honor their positive
duty to punish Guilty Twin, they must necessarily violate their negative
duty to not punish Innocent Twin. To honor the negative duty by
refusing to punish Innocent Twin, they must violate their positive duty to
punish Guilty Twin. This is especially problematic for retributivists who
claim that punishment is the “right” of the guilty, under the belief that
punishment gives respect to the wrongdoer’s autonomy. 22 It also
21. Deitch, supra note 1, at 963 (discussing criticisms that present examples of retributivists
punishing innocents and retributivists’ rebuttal that those examples do not amount to “punishment” in
the technical sense, but merely reflect unfortunate side-effects of actual punishment).
22. See, e.g., Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 864 (“Retributivism, however, honors
offenders to such a degree that it conceives of punishment as the right of the offender.”); G.W.F. HEGEL,
ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 126 (§100) (Allen W. Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991)
(1821) (“The injury which is inflicted on the criminal is not only just in itself . . . it is also a right for the
criminal himself.”); HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY AND
MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 41 (1976) (“a person has a right to be punished, meaning by this that a person has
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presents a special problem for those retributivists who refuse to consider
any person other than the offender in ascertaining whether the guilty
deserves punishment. For these retributivists, accounting for Innocent
Twin’s suffering in determining whether Guilty Twin should be punished
would force them to admit that retributivists should consider the
suffering of the offender’s family and friends, at least in some cases.
The same-person conceptualization allows retributivists to avoid the
problem of choosing between their duties, but it presents a host of other
problems. First, determining the level of culpability is difficult when
there are two minds at play at the time of the offense–one guilty and one
innocent. Second, intuition, biology, and the law all presuppose that the
twins are two persons. Third, analogizing conjoined twins to a person
with mental illness fails, because declaring conjoinedness a mental
illness is unsupported by accepted psychology. Even if mental illness
was a viable claim, this analogy would backfire because mentally ill
persons are not considered morally responsible agents, resulting in
reduced or no punishment.
Because pure retributivism centers on two absolutist duties, pure
retributivists’ analysis of whether they may justifiably punish the
conjoined twins halts after the first two questions. Pure retributivists
never reach the inquiries that follow the general decision that
punishment is justified. In an ordinary case involving a non-conjoined
wrongdoer, the pure retributivist would establish that the wrongdoer is
(1) a person and (2) a morally responsible agent who is guilty and must
be punished. Next, the pure retributivist would enter an analysis into the
appropriate degree of punishment. Pure retributivists never reach this
question in the conjoined twins problem because of their inability to
handle the twins’ personhood issues. Some impure versions of
retributivism successfully advance past the personhood inquiries.
However, as the analysis advances, they too suffer from fatal flaws in
determining whether and to what degree the twins may justifiably be
punished.
III.

IMPURE RETRIBUTIVISM’S CONJOINED TWINS PROBLEMS

Retributivism may generally be conceptualized as a desert-based23
a right to all those institutions and practices linked to punishment.”); JEFFRIE MURPHY, RETRIBUTION,
JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 134 (1979) (“The right to be punished and regarded as a responsible agent,
though sometimes painful when honored, at least leaves one’s status as a moral person in-tact.”); K.G.
Armstrong, The Retributivist Hits Back, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT: A COLLECTION OF
PAPERS 471, 484 (H.B. Acton ed., 1969) (“If we penalize the criminal according to what he has done,
we at least treat him like a man, like a responsible moral agent.”).
23. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 12, at 347 (“[P]unishment is justified because people
deserve it.”).
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and backward-looking24 justification of punishment. Although this is the
common thread of the retributivist theory, retributivism takes many
forms.25 Pure retributivism represents the strongest version of
retributivism.26 It is absolutist in its terms, firmly holding mandatory
duties to always punish all who are guilty and to never punish any who
are innocent. Many weaker versions of retributivism have emerged,
retaining the desert-based and backward-looking methodology while
avoiding the criticisms of pure retributivism.27 This Part will provide a
brief overview of the key tenets of the most prevalent impure versions of
retributivism: deontological, consequentialist, threshold, negative/weak,
victim-conscious, and mixed/hybrid.28 An application of each theory to
the conjoined twins problem follows each overview.
A. Deontological
Deontological retributivism, like pure retributivism, views desert as
both a necessary and sufficient justification of punishment.29
Deontological retributivism focuses on the blameworthiness of each
moral agent, considering each offender individually without accounting
for other parties.30 Because deontological retributivists evaluate the
24. See, e.g., A. Wesley Cragg, Punishment, in 2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA
605, 607 (Christopher Gray ed., Garland, 1999) (“[B]ackward-looking justifications see punishment as a
response to moral wrongdoing.”); R.A. Duff , Penal Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of
Punishment, 20 CRIME & JUSTICE 1, 6-7 (1996) (“[W]hat unites retributivist conceptions of punishment
. . . is their insistence that punishment must be justified . . . in terms of its intrinsic character as a
response to past wrongdoing.”).
25. See Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 865 (“There are a considerable number of
versions of retributivism.”).
26. See supra Part I.
27. See supra Part I.
28. Some versions of retributivism exist only to address particular aspects of justifying
punishment that are not relevant to the inquiry the conjoined twins problem presents: Whether a
retributivist may permissibly punish a guilty person when that punishment will also necessarily be
knowingly imposed upon an identifiable innocent person. For example, moralistic retributivism holds
that punishment is only justified when the offender’s desert is based upon a moral wrong, and legalistic
retributivism holds that punishment is only justified when an offender’s desert is based upon his
violation of a legal crime. Because the guilty twin in the conjoined twin problem has committed a
murder, his conduct is unquestionably both immoral and illegal. Thus, he deserves punishment under
both moralistic and legalistic retributivism. The question posed in the conjoined twins problem is an
inquiry into whether the offender may be punished when an innocent would also be punished, not
whether the conduct is eligible for punishment. For a discussion of moralistic and legalistic
retributivism, see Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 866.
29. See MOORE, supra note 3, at 156 (“The ‘deontological’ or ‘agent-relative’ retributivist
regards the act of punishing the guilty as categorically demanded on each occasion, considered
separately.”); Feinberg, supra note 5, at 614 (“In their pure formulations, [retributive theories] are
totally free of utilitarian admixture. Moral or legal guilt . . . is not only a necessary condition for
punishment, it is quite sufficient ‘irrespective of the consequences.’”).
30. MOORE, supra note 3, at 156 (“The ‘deontological’ or ‘agent-relative’ retributivist regards
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desert of each individual, they would reject certain prosecutorial
techniques that are designed to maximize punishment, such as plea
bargaining.31 For example, an offer of immunity to one offender in
exchange for his testimony against his confederates would be prohibited
under deontological retributivism, because the testifying offender must
be punished for his own wrongdoing, even if such an offer would result
in the conviction and punishment of his confederates.32
Deontological retributivists seeking to resolve the conjoined twins
problem face approximately the same issues as pure retributivism. They
hold absolute, obligatory duties to punish all who are guilty and none
who are innocent. Because the conjoined twins problem requires the
deontological retributivist to choose which duty to honor and which to
violate, the deontological retributivist faces an irreconcilable dilemma.
Because deontological retributivism is especially centered on treating
each moral agent as an individual, without concern for others, the
conjoined twins problem poses a greater threat to this version of
retributivism, compared to the other impure versions discussed below. If
the twins are treated as two persons, it is impossible for the
deontological retributivist to determine whether punishment is justified.
To honor his positive duty, the deontological retributivist must punish
Guilty Twin. To honor his negative duty, he must not punish Innocent
Twin.
The unique problem deontological retributivists face is the
extraordinary difficulty of treating each twin as an independent
individual. The twins, by their nature, are physically indivisible. To give
Guilty Twin his just deserts would violate the negative duty by
necessarily imposing the same punishment on Innocent Twin. To forgo
punishment of Innocent Twin would necessarily release Guilty Twin
from receiving his just deserts. The problem for a deontological
retributivist is that his theory prohibits him from accounting for the
desert of others in his determination of whether punishment is justified.
The conjoined twins problem forces the deontological retributivist to
consider the desert of one moral agent in assessing whether punishment

the act of punishing the guilty as categorically demanded on each occasion, considered separately.”).
This probably traces its roots to Kant, who argued that every person must be treated as an end in
himself. KANT, supra note 3, at 46-47 (“[E]very rational being, exists as an end in itself, not merely as a
means to the discretionary use of this or that will.”; “Act so that you use humanity, as much in your own
person as in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end and never merely as means.”)
(emphasis in original).
31. See MOORE, supra note 3, at 158 (“[T]he deontological retributivist might simply deny the
propriety of [common prosecutorial practices, like bargain justice].”).
32. Id. at 158 (“[T]he intentional forgoing of any opportunity to punish a guilty offender in order
to obtain the conviction and punishment of [another] offender . . . is more of a problem for the
deontological version of retributivism.”).
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is justified for another moral agent. Thus, the mere acknowledgement of
the difficulty he has in dealing with the conjoined twins violates
deontological retributivism. To avoid this violation, the deontological
could ignore the suffering of Innocent Twin and only look to the desert
of the named defendant, Guilty Twin. However, once Guilty Twin is
punished, Innocent Twin’s punishment is unjustified because it violates
the negative duty of pure retributivism, which deontological
retributivism adopts. The deontological retributivist cannot honor his
duties to each twin and cannot fairly treat each twin as an individual.
Because deontological retributivism’s application to the conjoined
twins problem faces roughly the same problems as pure retributivism,
with the additional problem of considering the desert of one in
calculating the desert of another, deontological retributivists cannot
resolve the conjoined twins problem.
B. Consequentialist
Consequentialist retributivism is the first version of retributivism
examined in this Article that softens the vengeful 33 tone of pure
retributivism by drawing on consequentialism.34 Consequentialist
retributivists are motivated by retributivist principles of giving just
deserts, but are willing to use consequentialist means to maximize
desert-based punishment.35 Perhaps consequentialist retributivism is best
explained in contrast to deontological retributivism.36 Deontological
retributivists treat each person individually when determining whether to
punish.37 By contrast, consequentialist retributivists seek to maximize
desert collectively.38 Suppose a prosecutor is prosecuting three guilty
persons.39 If the prosecutor offers immunity to one of the guilty persons
in exchange for his testimony against his two confederates, then the

33. Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 848 (“From its roots in vengeance, bloodlust,
revenge, retaliation, and eye for an eye, retributivism is pitched as the only theory which, in justifying
punishment, does justice”).
34. Christopher, Dilemma, supra note 13, at 146 (“The two alternative versions of retributivism
– ‘consequentialist’ retributivism and threshold retributivism – attempt to incorporate the consequences
of punishment into a retributivist framework.”).
35. Id. at 147 (“[C]onsequentialist retributivism seeks to maximize the number of culpable
wrongdoers punished.”).
36. Id. at 146-47 ([Deontological retributivism] demands the punishment of each and every
guilty person even if doing so foregoes greater opportunities to punish the guilty. In contrast,
consequentialist retributivism seeks to maximize the number of culpable wrongdoers punished even if
doing so foregoes punishment of some culpable wrongdoers.”).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 123 (presenting the prosecutor’s dilemma).
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prosecutor will successfully convict the two.40 However, by offering
immunity to the one, the prosecutor is forgoing the opportunity to
punish a guilty person.41 If the prosecutor is a deontological retributivist,
he will not offer immunity. An offer of immunity violates his duties to
treat each person as an individual–without regard to others–and to
punish all guilty persons.42 A consequentialist retributivist, on the other
hand, would offer immunity to that guilty person in order to punish the
two.43 The consequentialist retributivist will view this offer of immunity
as having good, desert-based consequences.44 By sacrificing one desertbased punishment, he will secure two desert-based punishments. The net
gain of desert-based punishments justifies forgoing the punishment of
the particular guilty actor.
As demonstrated by the bargain justice dilemma,45 consequentialist
retributivists are motivated by a desire to maximize desert.
Consequentialist retributivists seek a net gain of desert-giving. In other
words, forgoing punishment of one to convict and punish two is justified
under consequentialist retributivism, but the same cannot be said of
forgoing punishment of one to punish one. In the conjoined twins
problem, Innocent Twin deserves no punishment and Guilty Twin
deserves punishment. The consequentialist retributivist is only justified
in deviating from stricter versions of retributivism if a net gain in desertgiving can be achieved from the deviation. Regardless of whether the
consequentialist retributivist punishes or forgoes punishment, the result
is a net-zero. Giving either twin his just desert necessarily results in a
missed opportunity to give the other his just desert. Because there is no
possibility for a net gain when only two persons with opposing deserts
are involved, the necessary condition for deviating from the retributive
framework is unsatisfied. Therefore, the consequentialist retributivist
must rely on the baseline version of retributivism. Retributivism cannot
resolve the conjoined twins problem because either result–punishing
Guilty Twin or refusing to punish Innocent Twin–necessarily violates
one of retributivism’s core duties with respect to the other twin. Because

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 118-22; See George Fletcher, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 36-37 (1998) (“It is
patently unjust, in Kant’s view, to punish some offenders less because they are willing to cooperate in
some way with the state.”).
43. See Christopher, Dilemma, supra note 13, at 149 (“Since punishing the Two maximizes the
intrinsic good of retributive punishment, consequentialist retributivism provides a clear basis to accept
the offer.”).
44. Id. at 147-48 (“Although both [deontological and consequentialist] versions of retributivism
value a culpable wrongdoer receiving his just deserts, only consequentialist retributivism seeks to
maximize generation of that intrinsic good.”).
45. See generally Christopher, Dilemma, supra note 13.
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there is no net gain of desert-giving that could be achieved through
either result, consequentialist retributivists cannot rely on their narrow
incorporation of consequentialism to resolve the conjoined twins
problem. Thus, consequentialist retributivism cannot resolve the
conjoined twins problem any better than pure retributivism.
C. Threshold
Threshold retributivism is the second version of retributivism that
tempers its retributivist principles with consequentialism. Threshold
retributivism, more commonly termed “threshold deontology,”46
maintains the basic principles of deontological retributivism–that is, a
morality-based and agent-based view of desert and punishment.47
However, threshold retributivists limit the absolutist, Kantian view that
“though the heavens may fall, justice shall be done.”48 Under some
circumstances, if the consequences are exceptionally bad, punishment of
an innocent may be justified.49 Critics of threshold retributivism claim
that it collapses into consequentialism by considering the consequences
in its analysis of whether punishment is justified. 50 Threshold
retributivists combat this charge by arguing “[t]here is a very high
threshold of bad consequences that must be threatened before something
as awful as torturing an innocent person can be justified. Almost all reallife decisions . . . will not reach that threshold of horrendous
consequences justifying torture of the innocent.”51 Other critics demand
to know why the consequences of punishment only matter at and above
the threshold.52 Threshold retributivists reply that the consequences
46. MOORE, supra note 3, at 719-24 (discussing the theory as “threshold deontology” throughout
this section); Christopher, Dilemma, supra note 13, at 153 (“Threshold retributivism is merely threshold
deontology applied to the punishment arena.”).
47. See MOORE, supra note 3, at 722 (describing threshold retributivism as “agent-relative views
of morality with a threshold” and claiming that, “short of such a threshold, the agent-relative view [of
deontological retributivism] will operate as absolutely as absolutism.”).
48. Id. at 719 (“[A]bsolutism is often attributed to Kant, who held that though the heavens may
fall, justice must be done. Despite my non-consequentialist views on morality, I cannot accept the
Kantian line.”).
49. Id. at 719 (For threshold retributivists, “It is just not true that one should allow a nuclear war
rather than killing or torturing an innocent person. It is not even true that one should allow the
destruction of a sizable city by a terrorist nuclear device rather than kill or torture an innocent person.
To prevent such extraordinary harms extreme actions seem to me to be justified.”).
50. See Amartya Sen, Rights and Agency, 11 PHIL. AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 3, 7 n. 8 (1982) (“Such
a threshold-based ‘constraint’ system must rest ultimately on consequentialist analysis, comparing one
set of consequences . . . with another . . . and its distinguishing feature will be the particular form of the
consequence-evaluation function.”) (emphasis in original).
51. MOORE, supra note 3, at 722.
52. See Nancy (Ann) Davis, Contemporary Deontology, in A COMPANION ON ETHICS 205, 216
(Peter Singer ed., 1991) (“The addition of the ‘catastrophe clause’ is particularly problematic. Why do
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“always count,” but they are insufficient to outweigh deontological
concerns until a threshold is met.53 Thus, threshold retributivists are
essentially deontological retributivists who are willing to admit that
sometimes there are good reasons to violate their core duties, either by
punishing an innocent or by forgoing punishment of a guilty person.54
Short of a consequence as catastrophic as a nuclear war resulting from
honoring their duties, threshold retributivists rely on the principles of
deontological and pure retributivism.55
A threshold retributivist would naturally start from the same position
as a deontological retributivist in analyzing the conjoined twins
problem. Unless a threshold-eligible catastrophe is identified,
deontological retributivism guides the threshold retributivist.56 After
realizing that neither punishing Guilty Twin nor forgoing punishment of
Innocent Twin can satisfy the core retributive duties, the threshold
retributivist might be tempted to open his escape hatch and claim that
the consequences of either decision are so deleterious that the other
option is preferable. If he honors his positive duty and punishes Guilty
Twin, the bad consequence would be the infliction of suffering upon
Innocent Twin. If he honors his negative duty and forgoes punishing the
Innocent Twin, then he would release a known murderer into society.
Thus, the threshold retributivist might argue that the suffering of
Innocent Twin is so bad that Guilty Twin must go free. He could
alternatively argue that the consequence of letting a known murderer go
free is so horrible for society that Innocent Twin may justifiably be
punished. However, neither of these feared consequences, flowing from
honoring either duty, rises to the level of catastrophe that threshold
retributivism contemplates. Threshold retributivists are careful to limit
the availability of the escape hatch to include only situations where there
is “a very high threshold of bad consequences that must be

the effects of our acts on others’ weal and woe acquire relevance only at the ‘catastrophic’ level?”).
53. MOORE, supra note 3, at 723 (“[F]or a threshold deontologist consequences always ‘count.’
For behavior violating deontological constraints, however, until the threshold is reached, the
[consequentialist principle] is outweighed by moral principles.”).
54. Id. at 723 (“As the consequences grow more and more severe, the consequentialist principle
becomes of greater weight as applied to this situation, until at some point (the threshold) the
consequentialist principle outweighs competing principles of morality.”); For a critical perspective, see
Davis, supra note 51, at 215-16 (criticizing threshold retributivism and summarizing the theory as,
“[A]llowing that we may violate deontological constraints in dire circumstances saves deontological
views from the appearance of fanaticism, and thus confers greater normative plausibility on them.”).
55. See Christopher, Dilemma, supra note 13, at 156 (“Specific examples satisfying the threshold
include the demise of a nation, if the heavens will in fact fall, nuclear war . . . the destruction of a
sizeable city by a terrorist nuclear device.”).
56. Id. at 157 (explaining that, because the necessary threshold is not reached in the prosecutor’s
dilemma, threshold retributivists are bound by retributivism).
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threatened.”57 Short of that threshold, as with most real-life scenarios,
“the agent-relative view . . . will operate as absolutely as absolutism in
its ban on torturing the innocent.”58
The conjoined twins problem is a real-life scenario,59 but it is a rare
and exceptional problem. The frequency with which a problem occurs
should have no bearing over whether a consequence meets the threshold;
instead the focus should be on the magnitude of the bad consequence.
However, even assuming arguendo that the rarity of the conjoined twins
problem matters, the threshold retributivist still encounters difficulty in
arguing that the negative consequence of Innocent Twin’s suffering or of
Guilty Twin’s presence in society rise to the same high threshold as a
nuclear war.60 Evident in the examples of accepted thresholds–the
demise of a nation, the fall of the heavens, the destruction of a sizable
city, or the eruption of a nuclear war61–is an assumption that the bad
consequence must be certain to occur and certain to affect a large
population.62
If the threshold retributivist draws the line by accepting the suffering
of one innocent as a reason not to punish one guilty, then he is left with
no retributive theory of punishment at all. Instead, he collapses into
consequentialism and loses his defense that the threshold must be “very
high.” For example, if the threshold retributivist claims that releasing a
known murderer into society satisfies the threshold, he would punish the
twins. To reach this result, the threshold retributivist must argue that the
consequences of forgoing punishment of a guilty person–without a
showing that the guilty person will commit acts that are tantamount to
the destruction of a sizeable city–can be used to justify the punishment
of an innocent. This line of reasoning is flawed because one could apply
it more broadly to justify nearly all punishment. Put simply, if the fear
of releasing a guilty person on society can justify the intentional
punishment of an innocent, then the fear of a person committing any
future crime could justify the intentional punishment of innocents.
57. MOORE, supra note 3, at 722.
58. Id. at 722.
59. See Deitch, supra note 1, at 964 (“[C]onjoined twins have appeared as defendants in at least
four American courts.”).
60. The analysis could change if Guilty Twin were released on this charge and proceeded to go
on a killing spree. When he is prosecuted for the subsequent crimes and society’s fears are realized and
there is reason to believe that he will continue to wreak havoc, perhaps the punishment could then be
justified under threshold retributivism. At that point, there is a possible argument that the consequences
of refusing to punish Innocent Twin are tantamount to nuclear war.
61. See Christopher, Dilemma, supra note 13, at 156 (“Specific examples satisfying the threshold
include the demise of a nation, if the heavens will in fact fall, nuclear war . . . the destruction of a
sizeable city by a terrorist nuclear device.”).
62. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 3, at 719 (expressing uncertainty about whether the destruction
“of a lifeboat or building full of people” rises to the threshold).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss1/4

14

Deitch: Retributivist Theories’ Conjoined Twins Problems

2018]

RETRIBUTIVISM’S CONJOINED TWINS PROBLEMS

153

This one-to-one ratio erring on the side of punishment could
ultimately justify a system with a high rate of false convictions.
Punishing more–for example, through adopting a lower standard of
proof than beyond reasonable doubt–could be justified if innocents
suffering is deemed necessary to avoid the prospective release of guilty
persons. In addition to the problems of either favoring the positive duty
over the negative or collapsing into consequentialism, this solution also
rejects the Blackstone Principle, which Michael Moore indicates is a
ratio that is compatible with his theory of threshold retributivism.63
Most threshold retributivists would likely concede that the feared
consequences of honoring either duty do not meet the requisite threshold
to justifiably violate a retributive duty. 64 Where the threshold is unmet,
threshold retributivists may not use consequentialist considerations to
resolve the problem.65 Without license to use the escape hatch
(consequentialism), the threshold retributivist is bound by deontological
retributivism. As shown above, deontological retributivism provides no
resolution for the conjoined twins problem. Thus, threshold
retributivism fails to satisfactorily resolve the conjoined twins problem.
D. Negative/Weak
Scholars sometimes use the terms “negative” and “weak”
retributivism interchangeably.66 Negative or weak retributivism
addresses two concerns in justifying punishment. The first is an inquiry
into whether a particular actor may be punished. Negative retributivism
responds by only adopting retributivism’s negative duty to never punish
innocent persons.67 The second concern asks how much punishment is
63. Id. at 157, n.11 (“The retributivist might adopt a principle of symmetry here – the guilty
going unpunished is exactly the same magnitude of evil as the innocent being punished – and design his
institutions accordingly. Or the retributivist might share the common view (that the second is a greater
evil than the first) and design institutions so that ‘ten guilty persons go unpunished in order that one
innocent not be punished.’”); See generally WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *352. (“[I]t is
better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.”).
64. See Christopher, Dilemma, supra note 13, at 156-57 (arguing that the threshold is not met for
threshold retributivists where “the torture of one innocent [prevents] the torture of the two [guilty
offenders].”).
65. Id. at 157 (“Since a necessary condition for threshold retributivism is not met (the threshold),
threshold retributivism fails to avoid the Prosecutor’s Dilemma.”).
66. See, e.g., Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 865 (“Weak, or negative, retributivism
merely requires that a wrongdoer not be punished more than she deserves.”); Id. at 865.n.117 (“The term
‘weak retributivism’ may stem from Hart . . . The term ‘negative retributivism’ may derive from
Mackie.”) (citing H.L.A. Hart, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
233 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992) (1968) and J.L. Mackie, Morality and Retributive Emotions, CRIM. JUST.
ETHICS 3, 4 (1983)).
67. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Hating Criminals: How Can Something that Feels So Good Be
Wrong?, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1448, 1451 (1990) (book review) (“Negative retributivism . . . holds only
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justified. Negative retributivism sets “an upper limit” on the permissible
degree of punishment for guilty persons.68 The following sub-sections
treat these issues separately to illustrate the discrete issues the conjoined
twins problem presents for negative retributivists.
1. Negative/Weak: May We Punish This Actor?
Negative retributivism merely holds that “it is morally wrong to
punish an innocent person.”69 This may best be described in relation to
pure retributivism. Recall that pure retributivism holds two duties–a
positive duty to punish all who are guilty and a negative duty to never
punish an innocent.70 Negative retributivism may be viewed as a version
of retributivism that adopts only the negative duty. 71 Another way to
describe negative retributivism in relation to pure retributivism is to say
that, where proponents of pure and deontological versions of
retributivism hold criminal desert as a sufficient condition for
punishment, negative retributivists claim only that desert is a “necessary
condition of justified punishment.”72
Proponents of this version of retributivism argue that refusing to
punish innocents is sufficient to “avoid the evil” of consequentialism.73
that it is morally wrong to punish an innocent person even if society might benefit from the action, i.e.,
the retributive principle of just deserts is a necessary condition of punishment.”); J.L. Mackie, Morality
and Retributive Emotions, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 4 (1983) (defining negative retributivism as “the
principle that one who is not guilty must not be punished”); JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTIVISM AND
THE STATE’S INTEREST IN PUNISHMENT 156, 159 (1970) (arguing that only the negative duty to not
punish the innocent is necessary to avoid the evil– that is, taking rights of one person for a social good –
that utilitarianism seems to invite) [hereinafter MURPHY, STATE]; R.A. Duff, Penal Communications:
Recent Work in the Philosophy of Punishment, 20 CRIME & JUSTICE 1, 7 (1996) (“[A] ‘negative’
retributivism that forbids the punishment of the innocent (and perhaps also the excessive punishment of
the guilty) has been more common . . . than a ‘positive’ retributivism that demands the punishment of
the guilty, to the extent that they deserve.”) (emphasis in original).
68. Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 869 (“Weak, or negative, retributivism merely
requires that a wrongdoer not be punished more than she deserves.”); R.A. Duff, Penal
Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Punishment, 20 CRIME & JUSTICE 1, 7 (1996) (“[A]
‘negative’ retributivism that forbids the punishment of the innocent (and perhaps also the excessive
punishment of the guilty) has been more common . . . than a ‘positive’ retributivism that demands the
punishment of the guilty, to the extent that they deserve.”) (emphasis in original).
69. Dressler, supra note 66, at 1451.
70. See MOORE, supra note 3.
71. See J.L. Mackie, Morality and Retributive Emotions, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 4 (1983)
(defining negative retributivism as “the principle that one who is not guilty must not be punished”);
MURPHY, STATE, supra note 67, at 159 (arguing that only the negative duty to not punish the innocent is
necessary to avoid the evil– that is, taking rights of one person for a social good – that utilitarianism
seems to invite).
72. Duff, supra note 67, at 7 (emphasis in original); See also Dressler, supra note 66.
73. MURPHY, STATE, supra note 66, at 159 (arguing that only the negative duty to not punish the
innocent is necessary to avoid the evil – that is, taking rights of one person for a social good – that
utilitarianism seems to invite).
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Retributivists frequently criticize consequentialism for its apparent
ability to justify any heinous abridgement of an individual’s rights, so
long as the consequentialist can articulate a societal good derived from
that abridgement.74 By carving out a specific prohibition on punishing
innocent persons and by refusing to adopt a requirement to punish guilty
persons, negative retributivism offers arguably the least controversial,
least restrictive theory of punishment. Most would agree that knowingly
punishing innocent persons is morally wrong75 and would likely feel less
strongly about the morality of declining to punish a guilty person.
Critics of negative retributivism point out that it fails to qualify as a
justification of punishment because it provides no affirmative reason to
punish wrongdoers.76 Negative retributivism articulates no guidelines
for when punishment is justified. Instead, it merely states when
punishment is unjustified by prohibiting punishment of innocents. If the
purpose of justifying punishment is to set the terms for when it is
morally acceptable to impose suffering on another,77 then any theory of
74. See HART, supra note 66, at 5-6 (claiming that the argument that consequentialism can
justify punishing the innocent is the “stock retributive argument” against consequentialism);
Greenawalt, supra note 12, at 1341 (“[T]he most damaging aspect of the [retributivist] attack is that
[consequentialism] admits the possibility of justified punishment of the innocent”); Christopher,
Deterring, supra note 3, at 870 (“Retributivists’ principal, and most devastating, criticism of
consequentialist theories of punishment is that they justify punishment of the innocent.”).
75. See generally WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *352. (“It is better that ten guilty
persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.”); Keith A. Findley, Toward a New Paradigm of Criminal
Justice: How the Innocence Movement Merges Crime Control and Due Process, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV.
133, 136 (2008) (“Wrongful conviction of the innocent is a greater constitutional wrong than is failure
to convict the guilty.”); D. Michael Risinger, Essay, Tragic Consequences of Deadly Dilemmas: A
Response to Allen and Laudan, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 991, 1002 (2010) (“[F]or any given crime, an
error that convicts an innocent person is much worse morally than an error that acquits a guilty
person.”); Hon. J. Harvie Wilkinson, Essay, In Defense of American Criminal Justice, 67 VAND. L. REV.
1099, 1109 (2014) (“[The Blackstone Ratio] is about balancing the twin aims of our criminal justice
system: How do we punish as many of the deserving guilty as possible while ensnaring as few of the
innocents as possible?”); Daniel Epps, The Consequences of Error in Criminal Justice, 128 HARV. L.
REV. 1065, 1068 (2015) (defining the Blackstone principle as: “[I]n distributing criminal punishment,
we must strongly err in favor of false negatives (failures to convict the guilty) in order to minimize false
positives (convictions of the innocent), even if doing so significantly decreases overall accuracy.”); see
also Genesis 18:23-33 (Abraham asks God if He will destroy Sodom if fifty, forty-five, forty, thirty,
twenty, or even ten righteous people can be found in the city. God replies, “For the sake of ten, I will not
destroy it.”).
76. See David Dolinko, Some Thoughts About Retributivism, 101 ETHICS 537, 539-44 (1991)
(Negative retributivism provides no reason to punish a wrongdoer at all and does not serve as a
complete theory of punishment.); R.A. Duff, Penal Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of
Punishment, 20 CRIME & JUSTICE 1, 7 (1996) (“A merely negative retributivism, however, clearly
provides no complete justification of punishment: for it tells us that we may punish the guilty (their
punishment is not unjust), but not that or why we should punish them.”).
77. See Cragg, supra note 24, at 707 (“One of the basic rules of civilized society is that
deliberately inflicting pain and suffering on others always requires careful justification.”); Greenawalt,
supra note 12, at 1336 (outlining the three main concerns in justifying punishment as: (1) “why (and
whether) the social institution of punishment is warranted,” (2) what are “the necessary conditions for
punishment in particular cases [,]” and (3) what “degree and severity . . . is appropriate for particular
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punishment must articulate those terms. Put another way, defining
something by what it is not offers no definition at all; likewise, a
justification of punishment that fails to justify punishment is no
justification of punishment.
Although negative retributivism might not support a penal system at
all, one can conceive of a version of negative retributivism that adopts
the negative duty to never punish an innocent as obligatory and adopts
the positive duty to punish the guilty as merely permissive (and thus not
as a technical “duty”).78 If a negative retributivist supports a penal
system under these guidelines, he is vulnerable to the same criticisms
leveled against pure retributivism with respect to its failure to satisfy its
negative duty.79 In other words, every argument claiming pure
retributivism violates its negative duty by supporting or endorsing a
system that inevitably produces erroneous guilty verdicts80 and causes
the offenders’ innocent loved ones to suffer 81 also applies to this
conceptual version of negative retributivism.
Negative retributivism appears well-suited to resolve the conjoined
twins problem. By only adopting the negative duty, a negative
retributivist is unplagued by a need to honor the competing positive
duty. Guilty Twin deserves punishment, but the negative retributivist
bears no obligation to punish him. Innocent Twin deserves no
punishment, and the negative retributivist is obligated to set him free.
The solution for the negative retributivist seems clear: satisfy the only
obligatory duty by forgoing punishment of the twins.
Because the negative retributivist need not choose between competing
duties, the conjoined twins problem does not create a moral dilemma82
offenses and offenders.”).
78. No scholar has yet to endorse such a theory, but it is logically possible and will be considered
in this Article for the sake of comprehensiveness. Arguably the theory presented here is part of H.L.A.
Hart’s theory discussed in Part II E.
79. See generally Deitch, supra note 1, at 961 (discussing criticisms that retributivists violate
their negative duty when they endorse a system of punishment).
80. See Richard O. Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral Bases of the
Case for Capital Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1177, 1182 (1981) (“Retributivism is also haunted by
those executions of the innocent which inevitably occur if the death penalty is allowed.”); Christopher,
Deterring, supra note 3, at 900 (“Retributivists readily acknowledge that innocents will mistakenly be
punished, but dismiss it as an insignificant problem. Retributivists claim that though they know that
some unknown innocents will be mistakenly punished, no particular, identifiable innocent is
intentionally punished under retributivism.”).
81. See Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 879 (“Another way that retributivism is claimed
to justify intentional punishment of the innocent is that infliction of punishment on a guilty offender will
most likely inflict pain and suffering on his or her friends and family who are innocent of the offense.”);
Richard O. Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral Bases of the Case for Capital
Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1177, 1182 (1981) (“Retributivism is also haunted by those executions of
the innocent which inevitably occur if the death penalty is allowed.”).
82. See Christopher, Dilemma, supra note 13, at 137-42 (defining moral dilemma generally as a
situation in which an actor must select an option that violates his principles in order to satisfy another
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for the negative retributivist. However, the conjoined twins problem
illustrates and illuminates negative retributivism’s other flaws. By
releasing Guilty Twin based upon the absence of a duty to punish him,
the negative retributivist offers Guilty Twin a biologically built-in,
limitless defense to any crime. As long as Innocent Twin remains
innocent through Guilty Twin’s commission of offenses, Guilty Twin
never receives his just desert. Notice though that Innocent Twin’s
innocence is probably irrelevant with respect to negative retributivism’s
terms. By holding only the negative duty to forgo punishing innocents,
the negative retributivist may permissibly never punish anyone,
regardless of the person’s guilt or physical connectedness to another.
Retributivism, at its core, is a desert-based justification for
punishment. If this version of retributivism can justify indefinitely
forgoing punishment of a known murderer for no apparent reasons with
no internal qualms, then it cannot truly be a version of retributivism. It
neither issues punishment in accordance with desert nor justifies
punishment at all. Negative retributivism can, at best, be viewed as a
limitation on punishment. A theory of punishment that knowingly
allows a person who is guilty of a serious offense to go unpunished
simply fails as a desert-based justification of punishment. Because
negative retributivists can easily resolve the conjoined twins problem by
forgoing punishment, and because the physical nature of the twins plays
no role in the analysis, negative retributivism is neither retributive nor a
justification of punishment.
2. Negative/Weak: To What Degree May We Punish This Actor?
The above description of negative retributivism addresses the
question of whether punishment is justified (though, as explained, it
only addresses the question of whether punishment is prohibited – and
may feasibly permit always declining to punish). Another explanation of
negative retributivism deals with the degree of permissible punishment
for a guilty actor.83 Here, negative retributivism “sets the upper limit” on
the amount of punishment permissibly imposed upon a guilty offender. 84
The degree-based form of negative retributivism establishes a cap on
the amount of punishment that may justifiably be imposed upon a
person.85 A guilty actor must not be punished more than he deserves.86
principle, and discussing the various types of moral dilemmas on a spectrum from broad to narrow).
83. See Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 869 (discussing Hart’s mixed theory’s
assignment of amount of punishment and explaining, “The negative retributivism component [of Hart’s
theory] sets the upper limit . . . on how much punishment to impose.”).
84. Id.
85. Id.
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Naturally, this also forbids punishing an innocent person, because an
innocent deserves precisely no punishment. Like each version of
retributivism discussed thus far, which prohibit punishment of
innocents, punishment of an innocent is also categorically prohibited
under this version.
All versions of retributivism hold that punishing an innocent is
unjustified,87 but retributivists disagree about how much punishment a
guilty person deserves.88 Pure retributivism, and any version of
retributivism adopting the strong, positive duty, holds that guilty persons
must be punished to the fullest extent of their desert.89 Negative
retributivists do not adopt this requirement.
Degree-based negative retributivism is generally used as a guiding
principle in mixed theories and is not employed as a stand-alone
justification of punishment. For this reason, it is not subject to every
criticism leveled against the form of negative retributivism that seeks to
answer the question of whether punishment is permissible.90 However,

86. Id. at 865 (“Weak, or negative, retributivism merely requires that a wrongdoer must not be
punished more than she deserves.”).
87. See, e.g., Talia Fisher, Conviction Without Conviction, 96 MINN. L. REV. 833, 875-76 (2012)
(“Retributivists are concurrently committed to two fundamental principles: punishing the guilty and not
punishing the innocent. Deviation from either one of these outcomes is considered a departure from the
principles of just desert.”); But see infra Part II. C. (explaining that threshold retributivists admit that,
under extreme circumstances, intentional punishment of the innocent may be justified).
88. See Larry Alexander, You Got What You Deserved, 7 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 309, 315 (2012)
(“The ‘how much is deserved’ question has many facets, some of which have been copiously debated.”).
Common views of proportionality among retributivists are Kant’s lex talionis theory, Hegel’s annulment
theory, and Jean Hampton’s expressive theory. KANT, supra note 3, at 169 (equality between the crime
and the punishment, which is also called lex talionis or “an eye for an eye”); HEGEL, supra note 22, at
127 (establishing the principle that the offender’s suffering should be proportionate to the value of the
crime and that “what the criminal has done should also happen to him.”); Jean Hampton, Correcting
Wrongs Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1686 (1992) (setting
forth the “expressive” theory of retribution and advocating for equality between the suffering of the
criminal and the suffering he caused the victim, which demands that “a response to a wrong that is
intended to vindicate the value of the victim denied by the wrongdoer’s action through the construction
of an event that not only repudiates the action’s message of superiority over the victim but does so in a
way that confirms them as equal by virtue of their humanity.”); Adam J. Kolber, The Comparative
Nature of Punishment, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1565, 1595 (2009) (“Moreover, if we want to punish
proportionally, then we have to calibrate punishments to reflect the suffering that offenders actually
experience or are expected to experience as a result of being punished.”).
89. See KANT, supra note 3, at 169 (punishment requires lex talionis, equality between the crime
and the punishment); HEGEL, supra note 22, at 127 (“[W]hat the criminal has done should also happen
to him.”); Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 865-66 (“[S]trong, or positive, retributivism requires
that a wrongdoer be punished to the fullest extent of his just deserts.”).
90. Stated differently, the form of negative retributivism that attempts to answer the question of
whether punishment is permissible can be criticized for failing to provide any reason to answer that
question in the affirmative. By contrast, the desert-based form of retributivism does not attempt to
justify punishment or explain when punishment is unjustified. It merely addresses the question of how
much punishment a person should get after using some other theory to determine that punishment is
justified.
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degree-based negative retributivism is vulnerable to some criticisms
leveled against the other form of negative retributivism, including the
inevitability of a zero-error rate in any criminal justice system and the
suffering of the guilty actor’s innocent loved ones. For the latter
criticism, a degree-based negative retributivist could conceivably reply
that considering the suffering of others in calculating the appropriate
degree of punishment for the guilty actor is permissible. Given the
limited nature of the question that degree-based negative retributivism
answers, there is nothing in the theory that addresses whether only the
guilty actor may be considered in the degree calculation. Because
degree-based negative retributivism is folded into other theories, it could
conceivably be combined with a version of consequentialism that
accounts for a guilty actor’s familial status or role in the community.
Additionally, degree-based negative retributivism receives its own
unique, proportionality-based criticisms. For example, critics have
argued that mixed theorists who use degree-based negative retributivism
are “disproportionately lenient” because they decline to “[justify] the
punishment of guilty wrongdoers to the fullest extent of their just
deserts.”91 A degree-based negative retributivist might reply that it is
morally acceptable to fail to punish to the fullest extent permitted
because preventing excessive punishment and refusing to punish
innocents is all that is morally required to avoid evil.92
Turning to the conjoined twins problem, assume the negative
retributivist punishes. He will then need to determine the degree of
punishment. Guilty Twin deserves punishment to a high degree, because
he is guilty of a murder. However, Innocent Twin deserves no
punishment at all, because he is innocent. The negative retributivist may
not impose punishment in excess of the person’s desert. One person–
Guilty Twin–deserves a high level of punishment and the other–Innocent
Twin–deserves absolutely none, but any punishment will necessarily be
inflicted equally upon both. There is no way to reconcile the problem
presented. A negative retributivist may punish Guilty Twin to any degree
up to what he deserves, so the negative retributivist might impose a
punishment less than the fullest extent permissible. Whatever
punishment the negative retributivist inflicts upon Guilty Twin will also
be imposed upon Innocent Twin. With respect to Innocent Twin, no
amount of punishment can be justified under negative retributivism
because any punishment exceeds his desert. Thus, any punishment of
Guilty Twin would violate negative retributivism’s duty to Innocent
91. Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 869.
92. See MURPHY, STATE, supra note 66, at 159 (arguing that only the negative duty to not punish
the innocent is necessary to avoid the evil– that is, taking rights of one person for a social good – that
utilitarianism seems to invite).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

21

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 4

160

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 87

Twin.
Now, assume the negative retributivist forgoes punishing Guilty Twin.
Failure to punish is permissible with respect to both Innocent Twin and
Guilty Twin. The problem here is largely the same as the problem in the
preceding section. Failure to punish Guilty Twin is permissible under the
theory, but it is also extraordinarily lenient. Releasing a known murderer
is inconsistent with retributivism, a desert-based justification of
punishment. Apart from its inability to adhere to the retributive
framework, negative retributivism’s release of a known murderer for no
apparent reason demonstrates its failure to serve as a justification of
punishment at all.
E. Victim-Conscious
Some retributivists argue that victims should play a role in justifying
retributive punishment.93 Whereas consequentialists might consider both
actual and putative victims in justifying punishment,94 victim-conscious
retributivists–as advocates of a backward-looking theory of
punishment95–carefully limit their consideration only to actual victims
of the specific past crime for which the offender is guilty. 96
Victim-conscious retributivist, George Fletcher, analogizes his theory

93. See Fletcher, Victims, supra note 6, at 63 (“[T]he interests of victims may be properly
integrated into the theory of retributive punishment.”).
This traces back to Aristotle’s Theory of Justice, wherein Aristotle argues for justice as rectification:
“It makes no difference whether a decent man has defrauded a bad man or vice
versa, or whether it was a decent or bad man who committed adultery. The only
difference the law considers is that brought about by the damage: it treats the
parties as equal and asks only whether one has done and the other has suffered
wrong, and whether one has done and the other has suffered damage. As the
unjust in this sense is inequality, the judge tries to restore equilibrium. When one
man has inflicted and another received a wound, or when one man has killed and
the other has been killed, the doing and suffering are unequally divided; by
inflicting a loss on the offender, the judge tries to take away his gain and restore
the equilibrium.”
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 120-21 (Martin Oswalt trans., 1969) (350 B.C.E.).Fletcher, Victims,
supra note 6 at 58 (“Seeking to bring about equality between victim and offender is a classic concern in
Aristotle’s theory of justice.”).
94. See Adam J. MacLeod, All for One: A Review of Victim-Centric Justifications for Criminal
Punishment, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 31, 37 (2008) (“[Peter Singer, a consequentialist] does not
substitute traditional consequentialist concerns . . . for guilty usurpation of society’s legal standards as a
rationale or punishment. He instead uses impediment to the putative victim’s legal interest.”) (citing
Peter Singer, Pulling Back the Curtain on the Mercy Killing of Newborns, L.A. TIMES Mar. 11, 2005, at
B13).
95. See, e.g., Cragg, supra note 24, at 707 (“[B]ackward-looking justifications see punishment as
a response to moral wrongdoing.”)
96. See Fletcher, Victims, supra note 6, at 55 (“First, the victims that are relevant for our
purposes are the actual victims not the potential victims of future crimes.”).
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to Hegel’s norm vindication theory.97 Hegel argues that retributive
punishment seeks to restore the norm by defeating the aggressor
proportionate to the amount in which he disrupted the norm.98 He
famously characterizes punishment as “the negation of the negation.”99
For Hegel, the norm is defended by the punishment,100 but for Fletcher,
“the ‘victim’ takes the place of the ‘norm’ in the structure of the
argument.”101 While Hegel advocates for punishment that negates the
negation the wrongdoer created for the state generally, Fletcher views
the aim of punishment as restoring equality between the wrongdoer and
the victim.102 When a wrongdoer does wrong, according to Hegel, he
gains an unfair advantage over society that must be corrected to restore
equality. For Fletcher, when a wrongdoer does wrong, he gains unfair
dominance over his victim and equality must be restored.103 Fletcher
incorporates victims into both the corrective104 and the distributive105
dimensions of punishment.106 The corrective dimension is satisfied when
an offender is punished and the punishment “communicat[es] to the
victim a concern for his or her antecedent suffering.” 107 Through victimconscious corrective justice, the state punishes offenders to express
solidarity with victims. The distributive dimension is satisfied when
offenders are punished equally with respect to one another.108
97. Id. at 58 (“This victim-based argument does not differ, in principle, from the Hegelian
argument that punishment serves to vindicate the norms against those who have sought to defeat it. The
only difference is that the ‘victim’ takes the place of the ‘norm’ in the structure of the argument.”);
Hampton, supra note 88, at 1694 (“As Hegel appreciated, the modern state is the citizenry’s moral
representative; in the face of pluralism and religious controversy, it is the only institutional voice of the
community’s shared moral values.”).
98. See HEGEL, supra note 22, at 127 (“[W]hat the criminal has done should also happen to
him.”).
99. Id. at 123 (“[P]unishment is merely the negation of the negation.”).
100. See Fletcher, Victims, supra note 6, at 58 (“In the traditional Hegelian view, the norm is
defended and the aggressor symbolically defeated.”).
101. Id.
102. Id. (“[T]he position and dignity of the victim are rendered equal relative to the aggressor.”).
103. Id. (“The function of arrest, trial, and punishment is to overcome this dominance and
reestablish the equality of victim and offender.”).
104. Corrective justice can be characterized as equality between the victim and the offender. Id. at
58 (“Corrective justice seeks the equality that existed between the victim and offender prior to the
wrongful act.”).
105. Distributive justice can be characterized as equality between and among like offenders. Id. at
58 (“The distributive dimension of punishments consists in the legal imperative to punish all offenders
equally. The evil of punishment should be distributed fairly, with each offender receiving his just
deserts.”); Cf. MOORE, supra note 3, at 87-88 (“Punishment of the guilty is thus for the retributivist an
intrinsic good, not the merely instrumental good that it may be to the utilitarian or rehabilitative
theorist.”).
106. See Fletcher, Victims, supra note 6, at 58 (“Retributive justice combines features of both
corrective and distributive justice.”).
107. Id. at 58.
108. Id. (“The distributive dimension of punishment consists in the legal imperative to punish all
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The obvious criticism of victim-conscious retribution is that it fails to
justify punishment for crimes in which there is no identifiable victim.109
In response, Fletcher “fills the gap”110 by drawing on the retributive,
Kantian111 desire to avoid “the evil of impunidad–the phenomenon of
offenders getting away with their crimes.”112 By adding this component
to his theory, Fletcher limits his victim-conscious rationale to justify
crimes in which there is an identifiable victim, but maintains the
Hegelian rationale to justify crimes that merely unfairly elevate the
wrongdoer above society. Although Fletcher has attempted to justify his
victim-conscious approach using Hegel’s and Kant’s retributive
reasoning, critics nevertheless maintain that the underlying “powerimbalance calculus” is inherently consequentialist.113 By justifying
punishment with the focus on the balance of society as a whole, instead
of merely assessing the offender’s desert, Fletcher’s victim-conscious
version of retributivism collapses into consequentialism.
Jean Hampton takes a slightly different approach in her victimconscious, “expressive theory of retribution.”114 Rather than viewing
completion of wrongful conduct as the offender gaining dominance or
an unfair advantage over society, Hampton focuses on “moral injury,”
defined as “an affront to the victim’s value or dignity.” 115 The purpose
of the expressive theory of retribution is to correct the injury by
acknowledging and restoring the victim’s value. Punishment, she
argues, is the appropriate mechanism by which to elevate the value of
the victim.116 Unlike a parade for the victim, for example, punishment
creates an actual state of affairs.117 By analogizing retribution to
offenders equally.”).
109. See MacLeod, supra note 94, at 42 (“Fletcher’s conception of punishment as a means to
restore balance between victim and offender is criticized as inconsistent with retributivism . . . Fletcher
acknowledges some of the difficulties . . . for example, that many crimes involve no dominance over a
readily-identifiable victim.”).
110. Id. at 42-43 (“Avoidance of impunidad, he argues, fills the gap left by his dominated-victim
theory.”).
111. KANT, supra note 3.
112. Fletcher, Victims, supra note 6, at 60.
113. MacLeod, supra note 93, at 45 (“[Fletcher] has moved from the ranks of retributivists to the
ranks of consequentialists . . . The community is justified, in Fletcher’s view, in punishing a person in
order to restore an inherently consequentialist power-imbalance calculus. If this is what Fletcher intends
to argue, then . . . Fletcher has surrendered his membership in the retributivist club.”).
114. Hampton, supra note 88, at 1659.
115. Id. at 1666.
116. Id. at 1695 (“[P]unishment of the wrongdoer is uniquely suited to do the vindicating, insofar
as it created a state of affairs . . . in which the victim was elevated with respect to the wrongdoer.”).
117. Id. (describing a critic’s inquiry into why we should do harm to the wrongdoer instead of
bestowing a benefit onto or throwing a parade for the victim, Hampton replies, “[P]unishment of the
wrongdoer is uniquely suited to do the vindicating, insofar as it created a state of affairs . . . in which the
victim was elevated with respect to the wrongdoer.”).
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damages in torts claims, Hampton argues that retributive punishment
compensates the victim for his or her moral injuries. 118 To emphasize
the importance of the victim, Hampton also argues that the victim must
be someone other than the wrongdoer himself, rejecting a retributive
response to someone who attempts suicide.119
What Fletcher and Hampton both support is a version of retributivism
that stands in solidarity with victims. Where they differ is in their
narrower focus. For Fletcher, the wrongdoer gains an advantage over his
victim. For Hampton, the victim suffers an injury at the hands of the
wrongdoer. Under both theories, the state must correct an imbalance by
giving a wrongdoer his just deserts.
It might be helpful to apply victim-conscious retributivism to the
conjoined twins problem by altering the problem slightly. Suppose that
instead of murdering Victim, Guilty Twin inflicts physical injury upon
Innocent Twin.120 Guilty Twin is clearly guilty and deserves punishment.
Innocent Twin is not only innocent but is also the very victim of the
offense. Punishment imposed upon Guilty Twin will necessary be
imposed upon Innocent Twin-Victim. Victim-conscious retributivists
justify punishment of wrongdoers by viewing punishment as restoring
equality between the victim and the offender or as vindicating the value
of the victim. These theorists adopt punishment as the appropriate
mechanism to restore equality. However, in this scenario, punishment
will cause further harm to the victim. Equality may never be restored
because, so long as Guilty Twin is punished, Innocent Twin-Victim is
equally punished.
It may help to frame the theories in mathematical terms. Under
Fletcher’s theory, the offense puts Guilty Twin at a value of positive one
(1) and leaves Innocent Twin-Victim at net-zero (0). Punishment should
be imposed upon Guilty Twin to remove his unfair gain and restore
equality at 0. However, if punishment counts as negative (-1) with
respect to Guilty Twin, it also must count as negative one (-1) with
respect to Innocent Twin-Victim. Thus, Guilty Twin may be brought
down to net-zero (0), but Innocent Twin-Victim will be reduced to
negative one (-1). Equality between the offender and the victim cannot
be restored by using victim-conscious, corrective justice.
Under Hampton’s theory, the offense causes Innocent Twin-Victim to

118. See Hampton, supra note 87, at 1698 (“[R]etribution is actually a form of compensation to
the victim . . . retribution is supposed to . . . [place] the victim in the position she would have been in
had the wrongdoer not acted.”).
119. Id. at 1665 (“We also think it deeply inappropriate to inflict a retributive response on
someone who has wronged himself.”).
120. This alteration was also presented in Retributivism’s Conjoined Twins Problem. Deitch,
supra note 1, at 977.
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decrease in value from a net-zero (0) to a negative one (-1). Hampton’s
theory requires Guilty Twin’s punishment to restore Innocent TwinVictim’s value to net-zero (0). But punishing Innocent Twin-Victim
constitutes a moral injury to Innocent Twin-Victim by violating Innocent
Twin-Victim’s dignity. Because Innocent Twin-Victim does not deserve
punishment, his dignity is further reduced by Guilty Twin’s punishment.
The state’s punishment of Guilty Twin may restore Innocent Twin’s
value to net-zero (0), but the state’s punishment of Innocent Twin-Victim
reduces Innocent Twin-Victim’s value down to negative one (-1). Under
Hampton’s theory, punishment fails to achieve its objective because the
numeric value of the offender and the victim remain the same. It is also
worth noting that, because Hampton rejects retributive punishment as a
response to self-harm, a same-person conceptualization of the conjoined
twins results in forgoing punishment of the twins. This forgone
punishment constitutes excessive leniency with respect to Guilty Twin,
giving Guilty Twin a biologically built-in defense to commit further
crimes, and fails to restore Innocent Twin’s value.
Victim-conscious versions of retributivism cannot justify punishment
of Guilty Twin, because the punishment will necessarily also be inflicted
on Innocent Twin-Victim. Equality cannot be restored, and the victim’s
dignity cannot be acknowledged under either result. If the victim suffers
the same punishment as his aggressor, he will not be restored or
acknowledged. If punishment is forgone, the victim will not be made to
suffer through punishment, but neither will the offender. Under either
result, victim-conscious retributivism fails to achieve its primary goal:
solidarity with the victim. Thus, victim-conscious retributivism cannot
satisfy the conjoined twins problem.
F. Mixed/Hybrid
In an apparent effort to avoid the criticisms of either broad
justification of punishment–consequentialism and retributivism – many
scholars have devised mixed or hybrid theories incorporating aspects of
both broad theories.121 Because of the volume mixed/hybrid versions of
retributivism,122 it is not possible to include all of them in this Article.
121. See Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 867 (“In response to the seemingly intractable
debate between retributivist and consequentialist theories of punishment, there have been attempts to
combine the two.”).
122. Mixed theories have been offered since Cesare Beccaria presented his theory in 1764, which
combines utility (consequentialism) with justice (retributivism). See CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES
AND PUNISHMENTS (David Young trans., 1986) (1764). For a brief overview of Beccaria’s theory, see
Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 867, n. 128. For an overview of the various mixed theories, see
IGOR PRIMORATZ, Mixed Rationales, in 2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 559-61
(Christopher Gray ed., Garland, 1999).
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Instead, this Article discusses two: the most prominent version of mixed
retributivism and one of the most recent versions.
H.L.A. Hart presented his theory in 1968,123 and it remains the most
prominent mixed theory of punishment.124 Hart separates punishment
justification issues into two categories: the General Justifying Aim and
Distribution.125 The General Justifying Aim inquiry seeks to justify “the
practice of a system of punishment.”126 The Distribution inquiry justifies
“who may be punished.”127 Finally, Hart’s theory also presents a
proportionality component within the Distribution analysis that justifies
the amount of punishment imposed.128
For Hart, the General Justifying Aim of Punishment is reasoned
supported by consequentialism.129 The means used in individual
punishments to achieve this Aim is Distribution, which he argues is
justified by retributivism.130 Hart argues that it is “perfectly consistent”
to apply consequentialist principles to justify the General Aim and
retributive principles to justify the Distribution, and that by accepting
his theory, punishment theorists in retributivist and consequentialist
camps could cease their centuries-old “shadow-fighting.”131 For
proportionality, Hart combines elements from retributivism and
consequentialism to establish a floor and a ceiling, or a minimum and a
maximum amount of punishment. The consequentialist goal of
deterrence establishes the floor.132 Retributivism’s degree-based
negative duty establishes the ceiling.133 Thus, under Hart’s theory, the
appropriate degree of punishment to impose upon an offender must be
sufficient to achieve deterrence but must not exceed what the offender
deserves. Critics accuse Hart’s theory of “being disproportionately
lenient,”134 because it excludes positive retributivism from its
123. See HART, supra note 65.
124. See Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 867-68 (“Among these mixed theories of
punishment, the most influential is H.L.A. Hart’s.”).
125. See HART, supra note 65, at 8-13.
126. Id. at 8.
127. Id. at 11.
128. See Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 869 (“Hart’s mixed theory [has] its own
difficulty in setting the amount of punishment.”).
129. See HART, supra note 65, at 9 (“[T]he General Justifying Aim of the practice of punishment
is its beneficial consequences[.]”).
130. Id. at 9 (“[T]he pursuit of this General Aim should be qualified or restricted out of deference
to principles of Distribution which require that punishment should only be of an offender for an
offence.”).
131. Id. at 9
132. See Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 869 (“[D]eterrence concerns set the lower limit
on how much punishment to impose.”).
133. Id. (“The negative retributivism component sets the upper limit . . . on how much punishment
to impose.”).
134. Id.
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proportionality inquiry. For example, if deterrence is not achieved by the
punishment of a particular offender for a particular offense, then
punishment is impermissible, because the deterrence sets the floor for
the amount of punishment.135
To summarize Hart’s theory, the General Justifying Aim is satisfied
by consequentialism, Distribution is justified by retributivism, and
proportionality combines deterrence and degree-based negative
retributivism to establish a range of acceptable degrees of punishment.
With respect to the conjoined twins problem, the General Justifying Aim
of punishment is unproblematic. Consequentialist goals can justify a
system of punishment that punishes murderers. The conjoined twins
problem raises questions of individual assignments of punishment.
Therefore, Hart’s justifications of Distribution and proportionality are
the focal points of the conjoined twins problem because the inquiry is
whether (and how much) punishment of Guilty Twin can be justified
when Innocent Twin will also necessarily suffer the punishment.
Applying Hart’s theory’s Distribution component to the conjoined
twins problem presents largely the same issues that other versions of
permissive retributivism face in their resolutions. Distribution only
permits punishment “of an offender for an offence.”136 Guilty Twin is an
offender who has committed the immoral and illegal offense of murder.
Innocent Twin is free from guilt. Punishment of Guilty Twin is
permissible; punishment of Innocent Twin is prohibited. Hart’s theory
does not obligate punishment of each and every guilty person; it merely
permits punishment. As described above, critics note that Hart’s theory
cannot justify punishment of a guilty offender if deterrence is not
achieved by the punishment. Because punishment of Innocent Twin–
who is not an offender who committed an offense–is prohibited under
this theory, and punishment of Guilty Twin is merely permissible and
not obligatory, Hart would likely forgo punishment of Guilty Twin.
Forgoing punishment of Guilty Twin raises the same issues that negative
retributivists face.
If proponents of Hart’s theory instead elect to punish Guilty Twin, as
an offender who would be punished for an egregious offense, they
violate their duty not to punish Innocent Twin. Even apart from violating
the “who may we punish” prong of Distribution, they also face
considerable trouble in assigning the appropriate degree of punishment.
The charged offense is murder. The minimum punishment to deter
murder is presumably high, because murder is an offense that society
135. Id. (explaining that retributivist critics of Hart’s theory deem it “disproportionately lenient in
. . . not justifying any punishment at all of guilty wrongdoers where deterrence could not be
promoted.”).
136. HART, supra note 65, at 9.
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especially wishes to prevent. Protecting this heightened societal interest
in preventing murder justifies a greater degree of punishment. The
maximum punishment for Guilty Twin is also high, because a murder
conviction makes one eligible for punishments as severe as life
imprisonment or capital punishment under desert-based rationales. Thus,
both the floor and the ceiling are elevated for Guilty Twin. However,
because Innocent Twin deserves no punishment, the ceiling is actually
no punishment at all. Interestingly, proponents of Hart’s theory could
make a persuasive argument that the floor can be set with respect to
Innocent Twin. Recall that punishment of Innocent Twin is unjustified in
the “who may be punished” prong and that this argument only succeeds
in the proportionality prong; thus, by the time this argument is
presented, the Hart theorist has already violated his theory. To
successfully argue that the floor can be satisfied with respect to Innocent
Twin, the Hart theorist must show that punishment could deter future
offenses. Certainly, specific deterrence would be achieved with respect
to Guilty and Innocent Twin. General deterrence might also be achieved
through the direct punishment of Guilty Twin and the vicarious
punishment of Innocent Twin. Therefore, if the Hart theorist avoids the
“who may be punished” prong of the Distribution inquiry, he could
make an interesting argument that the floor requires a high punishment.
However, the ceiling, with respect to Innocent Twin, is no punishment at
all. Thus, the maximum punishment with respect to Innocent Twin
requires no punishment, but the minimum could justify a high degree of
punishment. Hart recognizes this possibility and emphasizes the
importance of the “who may be punished” prong, arguing that, while
vicarious punishment of an offender’s family could achieve
consequentialist objectives, it is unjustified under the retributive
principles.
Thus, Guilty Twin may permissibly be punished under Hart’s theory.
Innocent Twin must not be punished under Hart’s theory. The proponent
of Hart’s theory must forgo punishing both twins. This gives a
disproportionately lenient punishment with respect to Guilty Twin–more
precisely, it results in the release of a known murderer. Thus, although
this mixed theory attempts to reconcile the differences between the two
competing, broad theories of punishment and avoid the criticisms lodged
against each, the conjoined twins problem shows that it actually falls
subject to the criticisms leveled against both theories. Under its
consequentialist components, it can justify the intentional punishment of
Innocent Twin. Under its retributive components, it cannot justify
punishment of Innocent Twin and does not require punishment of Guilty
Twin. Although forgoing punishment is a solution to the conjoined twins
problem, it demonstrates that Hart’s theory is an insufficient justification

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

29

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 4

168

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 87

of punishment. Under this theory, a known murderer must be released.
The conjoined twins problem provides an example of why Hart’s theory
is disproportionately lenient. However, the conjoined twins problem also
exposes an additional vulnerability of Hart’s theory. Note again that this
theory’s purpose is to combine the favorable aspects of both
consequentialism and retributivism. Consequentialism can resolve the
conjoined twins problem by considering consequences apart from
deterrence, including the bad consequences for society if a known
murderer goes unpunished by virtue of a biologically built-in defense. In
other words, a consequentialist could make a defensible argument that
the interests of society (especially with respect to public safety) in not
providing a known murderer with a license to literally get away with
murder outweigh the bad consequences of punishing an innocent. By
holding onto retributivist principles that preclude a satisfactory
resolution for the conjoined twins problem, Hart fails in his ultimate
goal to create a bulletproof theory that combines the two broad theories.
His theory is subject to the same criticisms leveled against negative
retributivism.
Mitchell Berman presents a recent mixed theory of punishment,
which he terms “an integrated dualist theory of punishment.”137 Rather
than taking Hart’s approach and dividing the stages of punishment and
questions presented at those stages into categories and assigning
retributivist or consequentialist justifications to each category, Berman
divides cases into two categories. These categories are “core cases” and
“peripheral cases.”138 Core cases are cases that are correctly adjudicated
so the person being punished is factually and legally guilty. 139 Because
core cases involve punishment of an actual offender for an actual
offense, the punishment in these cases can be justified under retributive
terms.140 By contrast, peripheral cases are situations where punishment
is imposed upon a person who is not factually guilty (e.g., where there is
a mistaken identity) or legally guilty (e.g., the conduct fails to satisfy
each element of the criminal offense).141 Peripheral cases, which “all
involve genuine . . . error,”142 can be justified under consequentialist
terms.143 A third type, which Berman calls “degenerate cases,” involves
intentional punishment of known innocents.144 Because these
137. Mitchell N. Berman, Punishment and Justification, 118 ETHICS 258, 259 (2008).
138. Id. at 260.
139. Id.
140. Id. (“[C]ore cases of punishment are justified . . . on retributivist grounds.”).
141. Id.
142. Berman, supra note 137, at 262.
143. Id. at 260-61 ([P]eripheral cases of punishment are justified . . . on consequentialist
grounds.”).
144. Id. at 262 (discussing degenerate cases, including cases of scapegoating or prosecutorial
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punishments infringe on the rights of the innocent who do not deserve to
be punished, these cases are not justifiable.145
Applying Berman’s theory to the conjoined twins problem requires
only a brief discussion. Because his theory separates punishments into
separate “cases,” his theory operates under the separatist presumption
that the person being punished is a separate individual. The following
application assumes that the twins are two persons and treats
punishment of each as a separate case.146 Punishment of Guilty Twin
constitutes a core case, justified under retributivist principles. Because
Guilty Twin is factually and legally guilty of murder, his punishment is
justified. But punishing Guilty Twin requires the Berman proponent to
open a degenerate case with respect to Innocent Twin, because Innocent
Twin is an identifiable, known innocent. Although punishment of Guilty
Twin is justified, the punishment of Innocent Twin is unjustified.
Punishment of Guilty Twin requires the state to engage in unjustified
scapegoating of Innocent Twin for the sole purpose of achieving the
conviction and punishment of Guilty Twin. Thus, Berman’s theory fails
to justify punishment of the twins. The proponent of the Berman theory
must then forgo punishment of the Guilty Twin. This exposes Berman’s
theory to the same criticisms leveled against other impure versions of
retributivism, including excessive leniency by requiring the release of
Guilty Twin, a known murderer.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Application of the conjoined twins problem to impure versions of
retributivism–deontological, consequentialist, threshold, negative/weak,
victim-conscious, and mixed–reveals that there is no version of
retributivism that can satisfy the problem of conjoined twins. Even
where a theory seems to successfully resolve the problem by providing
an answer (usually declining to punish), that resolution exposes the
theory to additional criticisms. The conjoined twins problem is either
unresolvable under each theory, or it exposes flaws within the theory.
No desert-based justification for punishment can satisfactorily resolve
the conjoined twins problem.

animus).
145. Id. at 280 (“[R]ights infringing would be infliction of suffering that is not genuinely
supposed to be deserved, which supports the widespread judgment that . . . degenerate cases of
punishment are not justified.”).
146. An attempt to apply Berman’s theory another way would be nonsensical, because inquiry
into the factual and legal guilt of each individual is necessary in a theory that applies different
justification theories to different types of cases (those involving accurate punishments, those involving
mistaken punishments, and those involving deliberately inaccurate punishments).
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